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NOTES
CRIMINAL LAW

ATTEMPTED PERJURY IS A CRIME

Can a person be convicted for attempting to lie under oath? On May 31, 1954,
the Supreme Court of Louisiana in State v. Latiolais,' became the first court of
appellate jurisdiction in American legal history to sustain a conviction for the
crime of attempted perjury In fact, it is the first appellate court to be faced with
a lower court conviction for the crime. The defendant apparently had met all the
requisites for perjury- 1) intentionally 2) lying 3) under oath 4) on a material
matter in a deposition 5) to be used in a properly-constituted judicial proceeding.
It was then discovered that, unknown to the defendant, the notary before whom
the defendant had sworn did not have a valid commission. The prosecution ob2
tained a conviction for attempted perjury on a perjury indictment.
There is nothing unusual about the Louisiana statutes defining perjury, defining attempt, or describing indictment procedures that would cause this case to be
decided differently from a comparable case in another state.3 In fact, a reference
is made 4 in the Louisiana annotations which specifically puts perjury under the
common law definition, although Louisiana is a civil law state.
In this case defendant argued that perjury was akin to assault m that its very
nature precluded attempt. The court points out that perjury might be frustrated
in just such manner as in this case and still meet the statutory definition of attempt. This is correct, for the actual basis of the defendant's general contention
"that there is no such crime as attempted perjury" is founded on the absolute
dearth of cases on attempted perjury Although it may be an indication, mere
absence of cases is no foundation for the proposition that there is no such crime.
1225 La. 878, 74 So.2d 148 (May 31, 1954, rehearing denied July 2, 1954) Some early
cases used the term "attempted perjury" to define solicitation to commit perjury, but this
meaning is no longer applied.
2 15 LA. STAT. ANN. § 406: "Verdict where crime charged includes lesser crime. When the
crime charged includes another of lesser grade, a verdict of guilty of the lesser crime is responsive to the indictment, and it is of no moment that the greater offense is a felony and the lesser
a misdemeanor."
3 14 LA. STAT. ANN. § 123. "Perjury Perjury is the intentional making of a false written or
oral statement in, or for use in, a judicial proceeding, or any proceeding before a board or
official, wherein such board or official is authorized to take testimony In order to constitute
perjury the false statement must be made under the sanction of an oath or an equivalent affirmation and must relate to matter material to the issue or controversy
It is a necessary element of the offense that the accused knew the statement to be false; but
an unqualified statement of that which one does not know or definitely believe true is equivalent to a statement of that which he knows to be false
"
CALIF. PEN. CODE § 118 is analogous.
14 LA. STAT. ANN. § 27 "Attempt. Any person, who, having a specific intent to commit
a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing
of his object is guilty ot an attempt to commit the offense intended, and it shall be immaterial
whether under the circumstances he would have actually accomplished his purpose
An attempt is a separate but lesser grade of the intended crime; and any person may
be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime, although it appears on the trial that the crime
intended or attempted was actually perpetrated by such persons in pursuance of such at"
tempt
CALIF. PEN. CODE § 664 is analogous.
And see 15 LA. STAT. ANN. § 406, supra note 1.
4 CLARK AND MARSHALL, CRIMES, § 114(d)
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It only shows that no one has been convicted and appealed. The crime of attempted
perjury may have been committedmany times and gone unpunished.
The appellant's contention that an attempted perjury conviction does not
answer an indictment for perjury was succinctly disposed of by the court by reference to the statutory definition of attempt.5
A leading case in which the notary public's commission was invalid is State
v. Jackson.6 In that case the defendant was acquitted of perjury and no attempt
was made to get a conviction for attempted perjury Some other technical escapes
are listed in Corpus Juris Secundum: 7 e.g., the taking of evidence on a felony trial
in the absence of the accused; requiring a witness to testify without service of
process or some valid court order; a sworn accusation made to commence a prosecution, which is deficient in facts required by statute to give the tribunal jurisdiction. It should be noted that in all these cases the defendant most likely would
be unaware, at the time of his falsification, of these bars to a perjury conviction.
It should also be noted that technically faulty indictments in which a technical
factor is omitted from the charge will have the same effect on the prosecutioii as
the actual absence of the element in the substantive crime. There are two technical factors which have caused indictment trouble: (1) alleging oath-giver's authority and (2) alleging that the body before which the alleged perjury took place
had jurisdiction to hold the judicial proceeding in which the falsification occurred.
The general rule, and that of California, is that a perjury indictment requires
a statement of the authority of the party giving the oath; 8 Missouri requires a
specific statement that the oath was administered; 9 Arizona requires only a statement that there was authority to adnminster the oath, but not a definition or explanation of that authority; 10 Louisiana's rule appears to be one of the most flexible,
requiring only a statement that the oath was given," which is also a recentlystated federal rule. 12
On the jurisdictional allegation in the indictment, California seems to represent the general rule that at least a general statement of the jurisdiction of the body
be given; 13 Georgia is in the middle ground, stating that the jurisdiction can be
"inferred"; 14 while Oklahoma says specifically that only the name of the jurisdictional body need be stated in the indictment.' 5
Under the rule in State v. Latiolats,1 6 a conviction could be had for attempted
5 14 LA. STAT. ANx. § 27, supra note 3.
6 36 Ohio St. 281 (1880).

70 C.J.S. Perjury § 22(b), p.480.
People v. Dunlap, 113 Cal. 72, 45 Pac. 183 (1896), People v. DeCarlo, 124 Cal. 462,
57 Pac. 383 (1899), People v. Agnew, 77 Cal.App.2d 748, 176 P.2d 724 (1947).
0 State v. Martin, 317 Mo. 313, 295 S.W 543 (1927), see also State v. Biedermann, 342
7

8

Mo. 957, 119 SAV.2d 270 (1938).
10

State v. Broshears, 18 Ariz. 356, 161 Pac. 873 (1916).
"State v. Sweat, 159 La. 769, 106 So. 298 (1925), State v. Smith, 149 La. 700, 90 So. 28
(1928).
12 u.S. v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374 (1953), reversing a previous rule, requires only an allegation that defendant had "duly taken" an oath.
13 People v. Paden, 71 Cal.App. 247, 234 Pac. 920 (1925),

People v. Howland, 112 Cal.

655, 44 Pac. 342 (1896).
14 Williford v. State, 53 GaApp. 334, 185 S.E. 611 (1936).
1

5 Bennet v. District Court of Tulsa County, 81 Okla. Cr. 35, 162 P.2d 561 (1945).

16 See note 1 supra.

[Vol. 6

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

perjury even if an element necessary for a perjury conviction were omitted when
such omitted element was outside the knowledge of the attempter. For example,
if in a jurisdiction requiring it, the charge failed to state the source of the oathgiver's authority, then such an omission would not be fatal to an attempted perjury indictment. This is true because the usual attempted perjurer would not be
aware of the source of the oath-giver's authority If the indictment failed to state
a factor within the actor's knowledge (which would almost always include the
essentials of the substantive crime) then, of course, the indictment would be insufficient.
It may seem obtuse to mention these relatively rare cases of failure to gain a
perjury conviction due to the vagaries of the law, but perjury has become increasingly important in the light of the mass of Congressional hearings and sworn
statements required by government agencies. The threat of a perjury conviction
is the only weapon, in this life at least, to compel the telling of the truth. Making
attempted perjury a crime removes some chances that a defendant may escape
any and all punishment.
The rule should be that all attempts that fail due to forces beyond the actor's
knowledge should be punishable on the basis of the public policy in deterring crime
and confining persons with criminal intents. 17 State v. Latiolais8 fits well into
this suggested rule.
California, apparently adopting this rule, has been quite strict in convicting
parties who attempt to commit substantive crimes but who are frustrated by circumstances outside of the attempter's control. 19 Examples include the recent case
of People v. Van Buskirk,2' 0 in which the defendant aimed a gun pointblank at his
intended victim and failed to kill him only because the cocking mechanism failed.
Defendant was readily convicted of attempted murder. Convictions for attempts
have been sustained when a pick-pocket reached into an empty pocket,2 1 when a
robbery victim was penniless,' in an attempted rape when the act could not be
consummated because the automobile was too small,2 and when an intended murder victim was out of range of a shotgun blast.24 Certainly, State v. Latiolas is
analogous to these attempt cases, for in each of them, unknown or uncontrollable
frustration was no defense to a conviction for an attempt to commit the substantive crime.
By an extension of the Latiolas case and the analogous attempt cases involving other crimes, we are logically forced to the conclusion that absence of any
element unknown to, or beyond the control of, the attempted perjurer which would
prevent a conviction for perjury would not frustrate a charge of attempted perjury, but on the other hand, is the proper occasion for such a charge.
The most substantial contrary argument appears to be that if, in fact, there is
17

See John Barker Waite, Crinte Prevention and Judicial Casiastry, 5
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(1954)
18 See note 1 supra.
19 The leading case is People v. Lee Kong, 95 Cal. 666, 30 Pac. 800 (1892).
20 113 Cal.App.2d 789, 249 P.2d 49 (1952).
21 People v. Fiegelman, 33 Cal.App.2d 100, 91 P.2d 156 (1939).
22
People v Lee, 125 Cal.App. 623, 13 P.2d 943 (1932).
23 People v Welsh, 7 Cal.2d 209, 60 P.2d 124 (1936).
4 Smith v State, 8 Ala.App. 187, 62 So. 575 (1913)
fornia rule.
2, See note 1 supra.

an Alabama case citing the Cali-

